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THE LEGAL CONCEPT OF UNFAIR COMPETITION
Certain vague and indefinite phrases have a rather significant place
in the development of various branches of the law. Among such
phrases are "unreasonable conduct" in the law of negligence, "undue
influence" in the law of wills, "unreasonable restraint of trade" in the
effort to check the growth of monopoly, and "unfair discrimination" in
the regulation of affairs of public carriers. A phrase similar to these
and even more indefinite is that now coming to be known as "unfair
competition." However uncertain and indefinable the term may be,
unfair competition has gradually become of such import in statute law-
making and in judicial decisions that an attempt to discover the legal
definition of the phrase is necessary to understand certain parts of
modern commercial law.
The use of unfair and dishonest practices parallels the growth of
commerce, and the keen rivalry of modem commercial methods has
brought a great increase in fraudulent methods of competition. Many
attempts have been made to condemn unfair commercial practices and
to foster honest trading. The first statutes and judicial decisions
appear to have served as an obstacle to the grosser forms of monopoly
and of unfair trading, and with the growth of commerce and of
industry accompanying the Industrial Revolution came a demand for
free and unrestricted competition which swept away practically all of
the statutes and almost removed the restraint formerly exercised by the
courts. For a long time it was assumed that the best interests of
society were subserved by the regulation of prices and the control of
business through the operation of the economic laws of supply and
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demand. In England and in the United States, courts and legislatures
were slow to take note of unfair methods of trade and to place re-
strictions upon the use of fraudulent and dishonest practices. The law
of unfair trade in connection with trade-marks is largely the result of
a development of the last half of the nineteenth century, and the regu-
lation of unfair competition as distinct from the law of trade-marks
has come in the last quarter of a century.'
Unfair competition appears to have been used at first in connection
with the efforts of the courts to protect trade-marks. When the law
relating to trade-marks was specifically defined by statutes and by
judicial decisions unfair competition was hit upon as the phrase to
designate the wrong of a trader who attempted to pass off the goods
of another for his own. In this sense unfair competition was defined
in the dictum that "nobody has any right to represent his goods as the
goods of somebody else."'2 Recently unfair competition has been
extended in its legal import to include not only the passing off of goods
for those of another but also "any conduct on the part of one trader
which tends unnecessarily to injure another in his business."3 In
order to determine the legal significance of this phrase it is necessary
to note briefly the steps in its evolution. Before seeking the meaning
of the term as developed in the course of judicial decisions a brief
analysis is required of the relevant phrases in the Clayton Anti-Trust
Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act. These federal statutes,
the primary aim of which is to prevent unfair business practices,
render imperative a more exact definition of unfair competition.
UNFAIR COMPETITION IN THE CLAYTON ANTI-TRUST AND FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION ACTS
A notable step in the regulation of business in the United States
was taken in the passage of the Trade Commission and the Clayton
Anti-Trust Acts by which Congress declared illegal "unfair methods
of competition" and made provision for the prevention of such
practices.4
For a brief history of the origin of the term consult i Chenevard, Traitj de
la Concurrence Dgloyale en vnatiere industrielle et conmnerciale (1914) 24;
see also Davies, Trust Laws and Unfair Competition (1915). Extensive use was
made of this publication in the preparation of this article.
'Lord Halsbury in Reddaway v. Ban ham [1896] A. C. 199, 2o4; Hopkins,
Trade-Marks (3d ed. 1917) sec. i.
'Rogers, Predatory Price Cultting as Unfair Trade (1913) 27 HARv. L. REV. 139,
141.
'Sec. 5 of the Trade Commission Act not only declares unlawful unfair
methods of competition in commerce but also directs the commission to prevent
such practices by persons, partnerships, or corporations, except banks and
common carriers. The commission is authorized after due hearing to issue
orders requiring the cessation of unfair practices. To secure the observance
of such an order, the commission may apply to the federal courts, submitting
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Instead of defining specifically unfair competition, Congress, by
general decree, condemhed unfair practices and left it to the Federal
Trade Commission to determine what practices are unfair. In the
preparation of the Trade Commission bill, it was claimed that the term
unfair competition had a legal significance which could be enforced
by the commission and by the courts. It was thought no more difficult
to determine what is unfair competition than it is to determine what
is a reasonable rate or an unjust discrimination. The conclusion finally
reached was that it would be better to put in a general provision con-
demning unfair practices than to attempt to define the numerous unfair
methods.
It has been suggested that while Congress refused to define the term
unfair methods of competition and left to the Trade Commission the
task of giving meaning to the term in the handling of individual cases,
the object was to prohibit acts, which may be described as "economi-
cally unfair." 6  What is fair competition in the economic sense is a
question for the economist, and is one with which this paper is not
the entire record in the case, and the court may affirm, modify or set aside
the order. If new evidence is presented to the court, the case is to be returned
to the commission. A party ordered by the commission to cease unfair methods
of competition may likewise appeal to the courts for a review of the order.
The prohibition of unfair practices is further extended by various sections
of the Clayton Anti-Trust Act. Sec. 2 of this act declares it unlawful for
any person engaged in commerce to discriminate in price between different
purchasers of commodities sold for use, consumption, or resale within the juris-
diction of the United States, where the effect of such discrimination may
substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly and that nothing
shall prevent discriminations in prices made on account of differences in the
cost of selling or transportation, or in order to meet competition, in good faith,
and, with the further proviso that this shall not prevent persons from selecting
their own customers in bona fide transactions not in restraint of trade.
Sec. 3 declares it unlawful for any person engaged in commerce to lease
or sell commodities, patented or unpatented, or to fix a price therefor or a
discount from such price on the condition that the lessee or purchaser shall
not deal in the commodities of a competitor, where the effect of the lease or
sale may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly and
that large corporations except banks and common carriers may not have common
directors. Labor, agricultural or horticultural organizations are by a separate
section excepted from these provisions.
"The committee," says Senator Newland, "gave careful consideration to the
question as to whether it would attempt to define the many and variable unfair
practices which prevail in commerce, and to forbid their continuance, or whether
it would, by a general declaration condemning unfair practices, leave it to the
Commission to determine what practices were unfair. I concluded that the
latter course would be the better for the reason-that there were too many
unfair practices to define, and after writing twenty of them into the law, it
would be quite possible to invent others." (1914) 51 CONG. REC. 12136. For an
excellent summary of the discussion in the United States Senate, see Montague,
Unfair Methods of Competition (915) 25 YALE LAW0 JOURNAL, 20.
'Stevens, Unfair Competition (917) 4, 5.
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primarily concerned. But it is obvious that competition may be con-
sidered from the legal point of view as well as from that of economics.
"For the law must deal with men as it finds them; the law must
recognize that men are in a state of competition; concerning rights
and wrongs in that competition, the law must have something to say."7
It is the present purpose to discuss some of the problems involved
and a few of the difficulties encountered in the attempt to give legal
significance to the vague and evasive phrase "unfair competition."
The chief question for consideration is the legality or illegality of
various methods of business designated as unfair. The discussion will
be based primarily upon court decisions and legislative acts with a
brief reference ±o the advantages of an administrative tribunal to carry
out the specific mandates of legislation. Efforts to define unfair com-
petition will be considered under the following headings:
(a) The common law and unfair methods of competition.
(b) Attempts to prevent unfair competition by provisions in state
constitutions and state statutes.
(c) Unfair competition and the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.
(d) Difficulties and problems involved in the legal definition of
unfair competition.
(e) Preventing unfair competition through an administrative com-
mission.
(f) Some comparisons with respect to the methods of regulating
unfair competition in foreign countries.
THE COMMON LAW AND UNFAIR METHODS OF COMPETITION
Both by judicial decisions and legislative acts, monopolies were de-
clared illegal in England about three centuries ago.8 The criminal
statutes of the realm also declared illegal and attempted to forbid
engrossing, regrating and forestalling. Similarly conspiracies and
agreements to fix prices, wages and hours of labor were condemned.10
"Wyman, Competition and the Law (19o2) 15 HARV. L. REv. 427. There is no
agreement as to the precise scope of unfair practices in the economic sense.
A list of various practices designated by different economists as unfair practices
is given in Davies, op. cit., 311.
'Parliamentary protest for abolition of monopolies was granted by Elizabeth
in I6oi; Crown patent of monopoly for playing cards was declared illegal in
Darcy v. Allen (1602) ii Coke 84; the Anti-Monopoly Act was passed in 1624;
and in 1689 monopoly by patent of Crown was abolished.
'Engrossing was defined as the purchase of large quantities of a commodity
for the purpose of selling at an unreasonable price; regrating as every practice
or device to enhance the price of victuals; forestalling as the buying of victuals
on their way to market in order to sell again at a higher price. 5 & 6 Edw. VI.
ch. 14.
2O2 & 3 Edw. VL ch. 15.
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With the commercial development of the latter half of the eighteenth
century, these statutes were repealed and the principle of free and
unrestricted competition was considered in force,11 with the sole ex-
ception that according to a principle of the common law, "agreements
tending to fix prices or to control the market may be null and void as
in restraint of trade." Under this principle, the courts have developed
the doctrine of unfair competition, and have built it up largely on the
theory that business rules and agreements must not be unreasonable
or against public policy. The English cases declaring the meaning
and significance of unfair competition are not numerous,12 and the con-
sequent restrictions placed upon business methods were relatively
slight; nevertheless, in these precedents are found the beginning of a
far-reaching division of judicial decisions and legislative acts in the
United States and in the British Self-Governing Colonies.
In the growth of the law of unfair competition in England, we find
two lines of decisions. One of these culminates in the recognition of
the trend toward free and unrestrained business competition evidenced
in the repeal of the restrictive laws on trade and monopoly, and in the
judicial declaration of a laissez faire policy. A legal laissez faire
policy was announced by the High Court speaking through Lord
Morris, who regarded competition as the life of trade, and thought that
judges were not to be considered "specially gifted with prescience of
what may hamper or what may increase trade," and that he was not
aware of any stage of competition called "fair" intermediate between
lawful and unlawful. The question of "fairness" would, he thought,
be relegated to the idiosyncrasies of individual judges.13 The case
involved an effort to establish a monopoly and to ruin competitors by
special rebates to customers, by lowering of freights, by sending ships
to compete and by indemnifying other ships. But, since the association
did not forcibly interfere with the business and property of others, it
was held that there was no malicious intent and consequently no legal
"1 In 1772 criminal statutes against engrossing, regrating and forestalling were
repealed. Such acts were criminal under the common law until 1844. Cf. I
Bishop, New Criminal Law (1892) sec. 518; Doolubdass Pettamberdass v.
Ramloll Thackoorseydass (85o) 7 Moore, P. C. 239. In 1824 criminal statutes
against conspiracies and agreements to fix prices, wages, and hours of labor were
repealed. It is interesting to note that the war has resulted in many statutes
purporting to prevent and punish acts similar to those condemned under the
former statutes against engrossing, regrating and forestalling. Space forbids
an attempt to analyze these new acts or to undertake to review the efforts to
carry the laws into effect.
'The cases on which the doctrine of unfair competition is founded are Hogg
vz. Kirby (18o3, Eng. Ch.) 8 Ves. 215; Blofeld v. Payne (1833, K. B.) 4 B. & Ad.
410; Crawshay v. Thompson (1842, C. P.) 4 Man. & G. 357; Knott v. Morgan
(1836, Eng. Ch.) 2 Keen, 213; Croft v. Day (1843, Eng. Ch.) 7 Beav. 84.
" Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor, Gow & Co. (1892) A. C. 25, 50.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
damage. With such a ruling the business struggle for existence might
be waged with comparatively little legal interference.
Although the general tendency of the English courts was to accord
to those engaged in business a type of competition quite free and unre-
stricted, the courts were inclined at other times to regard certain acts
as unreasonable and unfair. Among these were libelous statements
regarding a competitor, bribery and corruption of employees, inducing
the breaking of a contract and palming off goods under a false desig-
nation.14 The term unfair competition at common law had its origin
in the broad principle of reasonableness and fairness whereby the
courts aimed to prevent injury to a rival competitor by misrepresenta-
tion. The definition of the term was begun by the English courts and
was later taken up by the courts of the United States with a tendency
in the new world to give the words wider scope and more definite appli-
cation in the condemnation of unfair business practices.
Among the acts condemned as illegal and unfair, separate from the
infringement of trade-marks, by both English and American courts
are: first, inducing a breach of a competitor's contract, holding it
unlawful to induce one party to a legal contract to refuse to perform
it to the damage of the other party.15 The cases at first held that there
was ground for action on breach of contract only when unlawful means
were employed or when the violation of the contract was secured delib-
erately to injure a competitor. Later some justices held parties liable
for procuring a breach of contract regardless as to whether fraud,
misrepresentation, coercion, or other unlawful means were employed
and supported the proposition that it was a
"violation of legal right to interfere with contractual relations recog-
nized by law if there be no sufficient justification for the interference."106
Second, the inducing of an employee to violate his contract was held
unlawful and a cause of action for damages.' 7  As a rule courts have
held that damages could be recovered only if fraudulent or otherwise
unlawful means were used.'8 Third, courts of equity have restrained
the disclosure or use of a trade secret by one who became familiar with
it through confidential employment, or have enjoined its use by one who
has acquired it."
"Cf. Cruttwell v. Lye (18io, Eng. Ch.) 17 Ves. 335; Croft v. Day, supra;
Lutnley v. Gye (1852, Q. B.) 2 El. & BI. 216; Lee v. Haley (I87O, Eng. Ch.) 21
L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 546. For summary of English and American decisions,
consult Davies, op. cit., ch. vii.
"For citation of cases, see Davies, op. cit., 336ff.
" Schonwald v. Ragains (1912) 32 Okla. 223, 122 Pac. 2o3.
' Walker v. Cronin (1871) 107 Mass. 555; see also Kinney v. Scarbrough Co.
(1912) 138 Ga. 77, 74 S. E. 772.
"
8 De Jong v. Behrinan Co. (1911) 146 App. Div. 936, 131 N. Y. Supp. 1O83.
"For citation of leading English and American decisions, see Davies, op. cit.,
335ff.
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The progressive development of the idea of unfair competition
may be discovered in the opinions of judges who first held that the
court would interfere solely for the purpose of protecting the owner
of a trade-mark and that fraud upon the public was no ground for
coming to court and that both fraudulent intent and actual injury to a
competitor had to be proved. Subsequently the courts began to regard
acts as constructively fraudulent if the result would tend to unfair
trade.
20
The general principle on which American courts based their deci-
sions was that whenever any agreement between competitors appeared
to involve an undue restriction of competition and which was therefore
detrimental to the public interest, the courts would refuse to aid in
its enforcement. Common-law principles favorable to the freedom
of trade and commerce were further extended by American courts
where restrictions were placed upon agreements as in restraint of
trade and against public policy largely because of the element of un-
fairness involved in such business transactions. For example, an
agreement for the sale of a business involving a restraint not to
exercise a trade over an extensive territory was held void; and, like-
wise, an agreement among competitors to restrict competition, particu-
larly in such efforts as might involve an attempt to secure a monopoly
or to corner the market, or to consolidate under common ownership.
Furthermore, efforts to control the entire supply or to combine to divide
territory and to shut out competitors or to attempt to fix prices were
sometimes condemned as involving not only restraint of trade against
public policy, but an element of unfairness contrary to common-law
principles.
21
"See especially Helmet Co. v. Wrigley Co. (1917, C. C. A. 6th) 245 Fed. 824;
Pa. Central Brewing Co. v. Anthracite Beer Co. (1917) 258 Pa. St. 45, 1o1 Atl.
925; McVay & Son Seed Co. v. McVay Seed & Floral Co. (1918, Ala.) 79 So.
116.
I Contracts to increase price, to limit supply and to control market were held
illegal or void in the following cases: India Bagging Association v. Kock & Co.
(1859) 14 La. Ann. 168; Arnot v. Pittston and Elmira Coal Co. (1877) 68 N. Y.
558; Santa Clare Valley Mill & Lumber Co. v. Hayes (1888) 76 Calif. 387, 18
Pac. 391; People v. Milk Exchange (1895) 145 N. Y. 267, 39 N. E. i62; More v.
Bennett (1892) 140 IIl. 69, 29 N. E. 888; Knight & Jillson Co. v. Miller (1908)
172 Ind. 27, 85 N. E. iO49; De Witt Wire-Cloth Co. v. New Jersey Wire-Cloth
Co. (189i, C. P. N. Y. C.) 14 N. Y. Supp. 277; People v. Sheldon (1893) 139 N.
Y. 251, 34 N. E. 785; Charleston Gas Co. v. Kanawha Gas Co. (1905) 58 W. Va.
22, 50 S. E. 876; Salt Co. v. Guthrie (88o) 35 Ohio St. 666; Emery v. Ohio
Candle Co. (189o) 47 Ohio St. 320, 24 N. E. 66o; Nester v. Continental Brewing
Co. (1894) 161 Pa. St. 473, 29 At1. lo2; Texas Standard Oil Co. v. Adoue (1892)
83 Tex. 650, 19 S. W. 274; Slaughter v. Thacker Coal & Coke Co. (1904) 55 W.
Va. 642, 47 S. E. 247.
Agreements to divide profits have been held void. Stanton v. Allen (1848,
N. Y.) 5 Den. 434; Craft v. McConoughby (1875) 79 Ill. 346; Mallory
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In the effort to draw the line between competition that is fair and
competition that is unfair, the courts have been formulating a few
propositions from which the modern doctrine of unfair competition
is being developed. Foremost among these propositions are:
(i) The doctrine of unfair competition in trade rests on the principle
that equity will not permit any one to palm off his goods on the public
as those of another. 22  When trade-marks and trade-names are defined
and protected by special statutes, which is now usually the case, the
courts lay down the next proposition.
(2) Unfair competition is distinguishable from the infringement of
trade-marks. The legal concept applies in all cases where fraud is
practiced by one in securing the trade of a rival dealer.23
(3) To establish unfair competition deceitful representation or per-
fidious dealing must be made out or be clearly inferable from the
circumstances and a property right must be invaded to constitute a
basis for a legal action.24  There is a tendency to relax the rigor of
this principle and to assume fraudulent intent where the natural con-
sequences of the acts complained of would be to cause unfair injury
and damage, and to extend the property concept to include injuries to
goodwill or interferences with the enjoyment of the rightfully earned
v. Hananer Oil-Works (1888) 86 Tenn. 598, 8 S. W. 396; Anderson v. Jett
(1889) 89 Ky. 375, 12 S. W. 670.
Agreements to secure corner were held illegal. Sampson v. Shaw (1869) io
Mass. 145; Raymond v. Leavitt (1881) 46 Mich. 447; Samuels v. Oliver (1889)
,3o Ill. 73, 22 N. E. 499.
Agreements to create a monopoly and thereby stifle competition were held
invalid. Chicago Gas-Light Co. v. People's Gas-Light Co. (1887) 121 Ill. 530,
13 N. E. 169; Chaplin v. Brown (1891) 83 Iowa, 156, 48 N. W. lO74; State v.
Standard Oil Co. (1892) 49 Ohio St. 137, 30 N. E. 279; Harding v. American
Glucose Co. (1899) 182 Ill. 551, 55 N. E. 577.
Contracts not to carry on business were held void. Alger v. Thacher (1837,
Mass.) 19 Pick. 51; Chappel v. Brockway (1839, N. Y.) 21 Wend. 157; Lawrence
v. Kidder (1851, N. Y.) io Barb. 641; Taylor v. Blanchard (1866) 95 Mass. 370;
Western Wooden-Ware Ass'n v. Starkey (18go) 84 Mich. 76, 47 N. W. 6o4.
Partial restraints have been held valid. Diamond Match Co. v. Roeber (1887)
xo6 N. Y. 473, 13 N. E. 419; Watertow Thermometer Co. v. Pool (1889, N. Y.)
51 Hun. 157.
'Dennison Mfg. Co. v. Thomas Mfg. Co. (1899, C. C. Del.) 94 Fed. 651, 656.
'Cole Co. v. American Cement & Oil Co. (19o4, C. C. A. 7th) 13o Fed. 703,
705; Weinstock, Lubin & Co. v. Marks (895) io9 Calif. 529, 42 Pac. 142.
" Church & Dwight Co. v. Russ (1goo, C. C. Ind.) 99 Fed. 276, 279; Wrisley
Co. v. Iowa Soap Co. (19o3, C. C. A. 8th) 122 Fed. 796, 797; Hires Co. v. Ville-
pigue (1912, C. C. A. 8th) 196 Fed. 89o, 891; Lawrence Mfg. Co. v. Tennessee
Mfg. Co. (89) 138 U. S. 537, II Sup. Ct. 396; Goldsmith Silver Co. v. Savage
(1916, C. C. A. Ist) 229 Fed. 623; Armstrong Cork Co. v. Ringwalt Linoleum
Works (1916, D. N. J.) 235 Fed. 458, 466. "The basis of an action for unfair
competition is fraud or deceit, inducing the public to believe that defendants'
goods are those of complainant." Keystone Type Foundry v. Portland Pub. Co.
(1911, C. C. A. Ist) 186 Fed. 69o.
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fruits of one's toil.2 5  Nevertheless, in most jurisdictions, it is necessary
to prove fraudulent intent, and to give evidence that actual damage
has resulted from unfair tactics.
(4) It is conceded that fixed rules are lacking for the clear guidance
of the court, and that to a considerable extent each case must depend
upon its own facts and be judged by the special circumstances in-
volved.2 6 In accordance with this view it is thought that unfair com-
petition like due process of law is subject to the method of inclusion
and exclusion without a clearly definable line between the fair and
the unfair, but each case must depend for its correct solution upon its
own peculiar facts and circumstances.
The grounds for giving relief in cases of unfair competition are
held to be: to promote honesty and fair dealing;' to protect the pur-
chasing public ;' to protect the rights and property of individuals.'
It is a matter of considerable difficulty to define the relation of
trade-mark law and the law of unfair competition. The law of unfair
competition has been usually considered as a development from and a
branch of trade-mark law. Until quite recently unfair competition
was classified in the digests under the trade-mark heading and most
cases on unfair competition are still to be found under this designation.
But efforts to take a rival's business unfairly by other ways than the
infringement of a trade-mark such as the imitation of packages and
the use of some deceptive name or label became more common. And
while at first the courts were not inclined to afford a legal remedy for
such a wrong it was finally conceded that equity should accord relief
jor other ways of stealing goodwill than by infringement of trade-
marks. For want of a better name "unfair competition" was applied
to these forms of commercial dishonesty.
30
Not infrequently, however, unfair competition was used in a general
sense to include trade-mark infringement, passing off, and other
business practices regarded illegal. And this general, all-inclusive
meaning seems to be gaining ground. From an analytic point of view,
it is contended that:
German-American Button Co. v. Heymsfeld (1915) 17o App. Div. 416, 42I,
156 N. Y. Supp. 223, 227.
'Burrow v. Marceau (19o8) 124 App. Div. 665, 669, ii0 N. Y. Supp. 1124;
Robertson, C. in Schonwald v. Ragaius, supra, puts the situation thus: "it seems
to be impossible to formulate any general rule or definition that will answer for
all cases."
'Palmer v. Harris (1869) 6o Pa. St. 156; Shaver v. Heller & Merz Co.
(igoi, C. C. A. 8th) lo8 Fed. 821.
' Singer Manufacturing Co. v. Loog (1882) 8 A. C. 15; Vitascope Co. v. U. S.
Phonograph Co. (1897, C. C. N. J.) 83 Fed. 3o.
' American Washboard Co. v. Saginaw Mfg. Co. (igoo, C. C. A. 6th) 1O3 Fed.
281; Levy v. Walker (1879) IO Ch. 436; cf. also, Nims, The Law of Unfair
Competition and Trade-Marks (2d ed. 1917) ch. ii.
Cf. (1919) 17 MicH. L. REv. 49o.
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"unfair competition is the genus, and the infringement of technical
trade-mark a species. In each case the redress is based up5on the right
to be protected in the goodwill of a trade or business."'1
The view supported by Justice Pitney, that "the common law of
trade-marks is but a part of the law of unfair competition," 32 is in
accord with that of other justices who consider unfair competition as
the genus and trade-mark infringement as the species' Thus while
unfair competition has been quite generally associated with the idea
of "passing off," in its broader meaning it has been regarded as in-
cluding all remedies heretofore available either at law or equity
covering
"the entire field of infringement in patent law, trade-marks, and copy-
rights; the protection of goodwill, trade-names, and trade secrets;
and all undue interferences with the normal current of a business
enterprise." 34
ATTEMPTS TO PREVENT UNFAIR COMPETITION BY PROVISIONS IN STATE
CONSTITUTIONS AND STATE STATUTES
While the first efforts to prevent unfair competition were made by
the courts either under some general principles of the common law or
as an expansion of the law protecting trade-marks, the subject has been
dealt with extensively in state statutes and constitutions. Statutory
provisions have had a two-fold object: first, to protect business men
from competitive practices harmful to them; second, to protect the
public from dishonest or fraudulent practices.
State constitutions occasionally provide that legislatures shall regu-
(19x6) 29 HARV. L. REv. 763.
"Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf (1915) 240 U. S. 403, 413, 36 Sup. Ct. 357.
Cf. United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Company (1918) 39 Sup. Ct. 48.
(I919) 13 ILL. L. REv. 708, 717.
A labania. Sec. io3. The legislature shall provide by Jaw for the regulation
or reasonable restraint of combinations to prevent them from making scarce
articles of necessity, unreasonably increasing the cost thereof or of "preventing
reasonable competition in any calling, trade or business."
Georgia. Art. IV, sec. 2, par. iv. General Assembly shall have no power to
authorize a corporation "to defeat or lessen competition."
Kentucky. Sec. i98. General Assembly shall have the power to prevent com-
binations from depreciating "below its real value any article or to enhance the
cost of any article above its real value."
Montaia. Art. XV, sec. 2o. No combination to be allowed "for the purpose
of fixing the price, or regulating the production of any article of commerce, or
of the product of the soil, for the consumption of the people. A similar provision
is found in the Constitutions of Idaho, Art XI, sec. I8, of North Dakota, sec.
146, of Utah, Art. XII, sec. 20, of Washington, Art. XII, sec. 22, of Wfyoming,
Art. X, sec. 8.
New Hampshire. Art. 82. Fair and free competition in the trades and in-
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late corporations so as not to prevent or to interfere with competition,
31
but as a rule the matter is left to the legislature for such regulations
as may seem necessary.
Anti-trust laws in the various states attempt to cover a multitude of
alleged business wrongs. Chief among this class of enactments are
the prohibition of monopolies and pooling; agreements or conspiracies
in restraint of trade; restraint of competition as distinct from restraint
of trade such as price control, increasing prices, fixing a standard price
or local price discriminations, limitation of output, division of territory
or restraint on resales. While monopolies and agreements in re-
straint of trade involve the principle of unfair competition, it is with the
last of the three classes of acts that we are now chiefly concerned. It is
this type of law which is designed to provide that there may be "reason-
able competition," and that aims to enact into law the doctrine of "free
and fair competition," as an inherent right of the people.
It is difficult to summarize the laws relating to unfair competition.
The prohibition of unfair competition is usually combined with the
prohibition of combinations and agreements in restraint of trade.
Recently, the statutes have dealt more fully and specifically with such
unfair practices as are coming to be designated unfair competition.
As a result of the experience of the last thirty years almost every state
now has statutory provisions covering monopolies or restraint of trade
or unfair discrimination and in a majority of the states an effort is
made to cover all three of these types of misdemeanors. There is a
tendency to declare illegal all combinations to restrain trade, to limit
production, to fix prices or to prevent competition. Usually a penalty
is imposed for a violation of the statute and not infrequently the
Attorney-General is charged with the enforcement of the law by
criminal prosecution or by quo warranto proceedings or by both
remedies against offending combinations.
3
dustries is an inherent and essential right of the people and should be protected
against all monopolies and conspiracies which tend to hinder and destroy it.
Oklahoma. Art. IX, sec. 45. No combination to destroy competition or to
discriminate unfairly between sections is to be permitted.
South Dakota. Art. XVII, sec. 2o. No combinations are permitted to fix
prices, to control production, or to prevent competition. Legislature is to pass
adequate laws.
"Ala. Code, 1907, sec. 7579; Iowa Code, 1897, sec. 5o67; N. M. St. Ig5, sec.
i686; N. D. Compiled Laws, 1913, sec. 9951; Ohio Gen'l Code, igio, sec. 6391;
S. C. Code, 1912, sec. 2441; S. D. Compiled Laws, I9O8, sec. 772; Tenn. Code,
1896, secs. 3191, 6622; Tex. Rev. Civ. St. 1911, art. 7796.
California. Combinations, which restrain trade, limit production, prevent com-
petition in manufacture or sale, and fix prices are prohibited. In fact, any
agreement which directly or indirectly precludes a free and unrestricted com-
petition is declared illegal. By a proviso the act is not to apply to agreements
"the purpose and effect of which shall be to promote, encourage or 
increase
competition in any trade." Reasonable profit is to be permitted in the conduct
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The attempt to extend the law on trusts and monopolies so as to cover
unfair practices which interfere with competition by individuals as
well as by combinations may be illustrated by the Mississippi statute
of 19o8 and the New Jersey acts of 1913. The Mississippi statute
declares that any corporation, partnership or person which shall destroy
or attempt to destroy competition in the manufacture or sale of a
commodity by offering the same for sale at a lower price at one place
in this state than another, or rendering service at a lower price in one
locality than another, is condemned. A trust or combine is defined
as follows: a combination, between two or more persons, with the
following objects, all of which are held inimical to the public welfare
and unlawful: in restraint of trade; to limit the price of a com-
modity; to limit the production of a commodity; to hinder competition
in the production, importation, manufacture, transportation, sale or
purchase of a commodity; to engross or forestall a commodity; to
issue, own or hold the certificate of stock of any trust or combine; to
unite or pool interests in the importation, manufacture, production,
transportation or price of a commodity.
The New Jersey act is made to apply not only to trusts and monopo-
of business. Acts, 19o7 and 1go9. A similar statute was enacted in Colorado
in 1913.
Connecticut. Combinations to fix prices "for ice, coal, or any other necessity
of life" are deemed illegal. Conn. Rev. St. 1918, sec. 6503.
Florida. Combinations to restrain or interfere with the sale of Florida meats
are condemned. Gen. St. i9o6, sec. 316o.
Idaho. Combinations to fix prices or to regulate production were first declared
illegal. Two years later agreements in restraint of trade were added to the
prohibitions and a provision covering other unfair practices was enacted, as
follows: any combination which gives any direction or authority for the purpose
of driving out of business any other person engaged therein, or who for such
purpose shall in the course of such business sell any article or product at less
than its fair market value, or at a less price than it is accustomed to demand or
receive therefor in any other place under like conditions or who shall sell any
article upon a condition, or restrain such sale by the purchaser shall be subject
to a fine or imprisonment. Acts, 19o9 and I91I.
Indiana. Combinations to lessen full and free competition or to fix prices are
void; likewise agreements not to furnish an article, to charge more than the
ordinary price or to interfere with a competing manufacturer; also effort to
restrict competition in the letting of contracts for private or public work. Ind.
St. i9o8, sec. 3866.
Kansas. Combinations which tend to prevent full and free competition, to
fix prices or to control the rate of interest and all contracts in pursuance of these
ends are declared unlawful. Gen. St. 19Ol, sec. 244o. Any person, or corporation,
doing business in the state and engaged in the production, manufacture or dis-
tribution of any commodity in general use, that shall for the purpose of destroy-
ing competition, discriminate between different sections of the state, by selling
at a lower rate in one section than is charged in another section, after equalizing
the distance from the point of production and freight rates therefrom, shall be
deemed guilty of unfair discrimination. A similar provision was enacted in
Louisiana, 19o8; Massachusetts, 1912; New Jersey, Nebraska, Oklahoma, and
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lies as was customary in previous legislation, but also to individuals,
and the title affirms as the object of the act to promote free competition
in commerce and in all classes of business. 37
The original notion of unfair competition, namely passing off the
Utah, 1913. In 1913 provisions relating to unfair discrimination and competition
in the sale of dairy products, poultry and eggs were enacted in Wisconsin and
Wyoming.
Kentucky. Agreements in restraint of trade or competition are deemed illegal,
also agreements to control prices, to boycott, to lessen lawful trade or full and
free competition. No discrimination is to be permitted between sections which
is intended to destroy the business of a competitor. Statutes, 1916.
Massachusetts. Provision for a hearing in equity on complaints as to monopo-
lies or efforts to restrain competition. Statutes, 1911.
Michigan. Contracts to restrain trade, control production, prevent com-
petition and fix prices are declared illegal. Contracts for exclusive use or sale
of an article and agreements not to engage in any business, are illegal. Unfair
discrimination as between localities is prohibited. Compiled Laws, 1897, ch. 253.
Missouri. Combinations in restraint of trade, to fix prices, limit production
and sale and "all agreements which tend to lessen lawful trade or full and free
competition are illegal." A separate section is added to prevent unfair discrimi-
nation between sections. Statutes, 1913, ch. 98.
Montana. In addition to statutes condemning combinations to fix prices and
to control production a special act of 1913 prohibits unfair competition and
discrimination in buying or selling commodities. Statutes, 1913.
New York. Agreements to create a monopoly or to restrain competition are
declared void. Agreements to raise wages are excepted, also collective bargaining
among farmers and fruit growers. Statutes, 1918.
North Dakota. Art. 66 on Trade Discrimination and Unfair Competition.
Sec. 3043, Unfair Competition: any person or corporation engaged in business
relating to any commodity in general use which shall aim to create a monopoly,
or to destroy the business of a competitor, or to prevent competition, or to dis-
criminate between different sections in the purchase or sale of any commodity
shall be guilty of unfair discrimination. Compiled Laws, 1913.
Washington. Combinations among commission merchants in the marketing
of farm and dairy products are prohibited. Code, sec. 7032.
' The definition of a trust is thus extended in the New Jersey statute:
A trust is a combination or agreement between corporations, firms or persons,
any two or more of them, for the following purposes, and such trust is
hereby declared to be illegal and indictable:
(i) To create or carry out restrictions in trade or to acquire a monopoly,
either in intrastate or interstate business or commerce.
(2) To limit or reduce the production or increase the price of merchandise
or of any commodity.
(3) To prevent competition in manufacturing, making, transporting, selling
and purchasing of merchandise, produce or any commodity.
(4) To fix at any standard or figure, whereby its price to the public or
consumer shall in any manner be controlled, any article or commodity or mer-
chandise, produce or commerce, intended for sale, use or consumption in this
state or elsewhere.
(5) To make any agreement by which they directly or indirectly preclude
a free and unrestricted competition among themselves, or any purchaser or con-
sumer, in the sale or transportation of any article or commodity, either by pooling,
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goods of one person or corporation as those of another, was made
a misdemeanor in New York. Unauthorized use of names of corpo-
rations or of individuals is made a criminal offense in a few states, while
counterfeiting or the fraudulent use of labels or trade-marks is pro-
hibited in the majority of the states. False or misleading advertising
which encourages passing off is now generally prohibited. Statutes
relating to this matter were chiefly enacted in 1913 and 1914. Any
effort to place before the public an advertisement which is untrue,
deceptive or misleading is also declared to be a misdemeanor. A
number of states prohibit false marking as to number, kind, quantity,
weight, measure, quality, grade or place of production. Similarly,
conducting business under an assumed name is sometimes prohibited.
Among other practices relating to unfair competition and often in-
cluded under the term are bribery and enticement of employees which
are made criminal offenses in about one-third of the states. The New
York law which -declares a misdemeanor punishable by fine the giving
of a bonus to influence an employee has been followed in the states
enacting this provision. Other groups of enactments are closely
related to unfair competition but it is impossible to deal with them at
this time.38
From a survey of the statutory provisions, it appears that efforts
were first directed toward enlarging and extending the common-law
prohibition against contracts in restraint of trade and of repressing
the grosser forms of monopoly, subsequently unfair discrimination be-
tween sections and localities was prohibited, and finally statutes were
enacted attempting to cover other unfair practices under the general
term unfair competition. The first laws were so drastic that they
were virtually unenforceable and were frequently disregarded, or
mollified by the courts when combinations were assailed thereunder.
Judging from the number and scope of the laws on unfair practices
comparatively few of the wrongful acts of business combinations have
received judicial disapproval and have thereby been effectively pro-
hibited. Courts as well as legislatures have gradually realized that in
order to check unfair practices the nature of the offense must be more
clearly defined and the specific acts to be condemned must be well
withholding from the market or selling at a fixed price, or in any other manner
by which the price might be affected.(6) To make any secret oral agreement or arrive at an understanding
without express agreement by which they directly or indirectly preclude a free
and unrestricted competition among themselves, or any purchaser or consumer,
in the sale or transportation of any article, either by pooling, withholding from
the market, or selling at a fixed price, or in any other manner by which the
price might be affected.
Furthermore, discrimination in commercial transactions by either persons
or corporations between persons or different sections of the state is prohibited.
' For a summary of the laws enacted prior to 1915 consult Davies, op. cit.,
ch. ix.
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understood. To draw the line between fair and unfair, between
reasonable and unreasonable in business methods is very difficult, but
this difficulty must be faced before legislation on unfair competition
may result in improving business ethics.
UNFAIR COMPETITION AND THE SHERMAN ANTI-TRUST ACT
The law of unfair competition as developed by the courts under prin-
ciples of the common law was materially extended by the enactment and
interpretation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. The manifold business
practices condemned under the Sherman law are too numerous to
permit of consideration except in so far as the decisions of the courts
have aimed to define restraint of trade in terms of what is now re-
garded as unfair competition. While unfair competition is generally
considered as differing from restraint of trade, the federal courts have
recently defined restraint of trade so as to embrace a number of
offenses usually designated as unfair competition. There is a differ-
ence of opinion as to the intent of the Sherman law, but the prevailing
view is that its object was to support and render more specific the
common-law rule on restraint of trade. This rule involved two prin-
ciples, one the principle of reasonableness in the making of busi-
ness contracts with respect to the interests of the parties concerned
and the other that agreements contrary to public policy are void.
Although the courts differed widely on the application of the
principle of reasonableness there was pretty general agreement in
the United States in holding void as in restraint of trade and
as contrary to public policy agreements restricting output, corner-
ing the supply, dividing markets or profits, fixing prices or estab-
lishing a common selling agency. In the light of these decisions
the federal act of 189o laid down no new principle. Its chief
purpose was to make more explicit the condemnation of business con-
duct regarded as contrary to public policy and to strengthen the con-
demnation by making infractions thereof subject to a criminal penalty.
The Sherman act as originally applied was given quite a narrow in-
terpretation.39 With the change which came in the interpretation of the
act through the Trans-Missouri Freight Association9 and the North-
ern Securities41 cases and finally the more specific decrees of the Stand-
ard Oil Company and the Tobacco Trust cases 42 the Sherman act has
become an important factor in prohibiting unfair commercial methods.
The court in Nash v. the United States said: "that only such contracts
and combinations are within the act as by reason of intent or the
inherent nature of the contemplated acts prejudice the public interests
= United States v. Knight Co. (1895) i56 U. S. i, i5 Sup. Ct. 249.
(i897) I66 U. S. 290, 17 Sup. Ct. 540.
(i9o4) 193 U. S. 197, 24 Sup. Ct. 436.
(igio) 221 U. S. i and io6, 31 Sup. Ct. 5o2, 632.
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by unduly restricting competition or unduly obstructing the course of
trade."43
The federal courts have condemned under the act business dealings
which operate to destroy the potentiality of competition and according
to the dominant line of decisions the courts hold that it is the power to
destroy competition and not its exercise which is the test. In the deter-
mination of what is judicially held to constitute unfair competition the
provisions of the act, says Chief Justice White, are founded in broad
conceptions of public policy to prevent not only injury to individuals,
but also harm to the general public, 44 and in not a few cases the court
has definitely decided that unfair conduct toward competitors consti-
tuted the violation of the statute. That unfair conduct toward com-
petitors was the basis of the decree condemning a combination was
especially evident in the Standard Oil Company, the Tobacco Trust and
the Keystone Watch cases.45 The object of the Sherman act is held
to be not only to prevent combinations but also to preserve and restore
free competition.48
In so far as the act is held to prevent unfair practices a comprehen-
sive plan of relief is provided as follows: first, criminal prosecution by
the government under sections one and two for all violations past and
present; second, an injunction on complaint by the Attorney-General
under section four against all present and threatened violations of the
act; third, civil suits under section seven by any one injured against
a violator of the act.
The extent to which unfair practices may be condemned under the
Sherman law is illustrated by the decree of the federal court in the
case of United States v. Bowser & Co.47  By order of the court the
offending company was enjoined from making to customers false
representations concerning the standing or business methods of com-
petitors, from bribing individuals to use their influence in promoting
sales of defendants' products or in preventing sales of competitors'
products; from procuring parties to take employment with competitors
for the purpose of securing information; from inducing or hiring any
person to secure names and addresses of competitors' customers; from
attempting to secure cancellation of orders secured by competitors;
from agreeing to indemnify customers from losses from litigation, on
condition that they cancel contracts with competitors; from reducing
the price of their product below cost of production, or giving it away,
in order to prevent sales by competitors; or discriminating in price
'Nash v. United States (1913) 229 U. S. 373, 376, 33 Sup. Ct. 780.
" Wilder Mfg. Co. v. Cori Products Co. (1915) 236 U. S. 165, 174, 35 Sup. Ct.
398, 401.
(1915, E. D. Pa.) 218 Fed. 502.
United States v. Chesapeake & 0. Fuel Co. (igoo, C. C. S. D. Oh. W. D.)
105 Fed. 93.
1 (1i6) 63 TiE ANNALS, 10.
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between different persons or localities with the purpose to injure the
business of competitors; from committing any other similar acts of
unfair competition, the purpose of which shall be to injure or destroy
the business of any competitor, to substantially lessen competition
in the product or otherwise restrain interstate trade or commerce, or
tend to create a monopoly therein in favor of defendants.48
At first the courts in the interpretation of the Sherman law were
inclined to hold that in order to constitute restraint there must be con-
trol over the entire commodity.49 Later it was held sufficient to con-
demn a combination if it really tended to monopolize and to deprive
the public of the advantages of free competition.5" This country, the
court said on one occasion, has always been committed to the principle
of fair competition and the Sherman act has been interpreted as a
means to bring about this desired condition.5 ' Finally in far-reaching
decrees the federal courts have condemned most of the practices com-
monly considered as unfair methods of competition. Among the
methods which have been especially attacked as unfair under the
Sherman law are: agreements to fix prices, restrict production and
divide markets.5 2  Furthermore, by consent decrees under the authority
of the Sherman law various companies were enjoined from the use of
bogus independents to maintain the appearance of competition, from
the use of fighting brands, from exclusive dealing and various forms
of tying contracts, from inducing breach of competitor's contract,
from corruption and bribery of employees, and from boycotting and
blacklisting by trade associations. The prohibition of unfair competi-
tive methods by the courts under the Sherman law has been accom-
plished in large part by such consent decrees wherein the combination
charged with a violation of the act admitted the violation and agreed
to the terms of a decree satisfactory to the Department of Justice.
53
The criminal clauses of the Sherman act have resulted in a consider-
able number of charges and prosecutions but in relatively few and
almost totally ineffective indictments. At first the federal courts were
SIbid., ii.
United States v. Nelson (1892 D. Minn.) 52 Fed. 646; Dueber Watch-Case
Manuf'g Co. v. Howard Watch & Clock Co. (1895, C. C. A. 2d) 66 Fed. 637.
' United States v. Addyston Pipe and Steel Co. (1898 C. C. A. 6th) 85 Fed.
271; Montague & Co. v. Lowry (1904) 193 U. S. 38, 24 Sup. Ct. 307.
"1 United States v. United States Steel Corporationt (1915, D. N. J.) 223 Fed.
55, 155.
2 National Harrow Co. v. Henclz (1896, E. D. Pa.) 76 Fed. 667; United
States v. Coal Dealers' Ass'n (1898, N. D. Calif.) 85 Fed. 252; Chesapeake &
Ohio Fuel Co. v. United States (19o2, C. C. A. 6th) 15 Fed. 61o; Gibbs v.
McNeeley (19o2. C. C. A. 9th) 118 Fed. 12o; Addyston Pipe and Steel Co. v.
United States (1899) 175 U. S. 211, 2o Sup. Ct. 96; Continental Wall Paper Co.
v. Voight & Sons Co. (199o) 212 U. S. 227, 29 Sup. Ct. 280; United States v.
Patten (1913) 226 U. S. 525, 33 Sup. Ct. 141; United States v. Great Lakcs
Towing Co. (1914, N. D. Oh. E. D.) 217 Fed. 656.
'For a brief review of consent decrees, see Davies, op. cit., 478ff.
2
YALE LAW JOURNAL
disposed to dismiss criminal indictments under the act because of the
uncertainty as to the specific acts that constituted a crime.5 4 When the
act was so interpreted as to make it an effective weapon in checking
certain types of monopoly there was an effort to apply the criminal
clauses to the grosser wrongs committed by the managers or directors
of large combinations. The courts refused at times to convict for
criminal charges although it was clear that restraint was exercised over
competitors by force, slander and libel and that there was an evident
purpose to drive out competitors by violence, annoyance and intimida-
tion.55 But it was later decided that the vagueness in the definition
of the crime did not render the Sherman law inoperative on its criminal
side and that it is hot necessary to give evidence of overt acts in an
indictment charging a conspiracy to restrain trade.56
While the number and scope of the decrees of the federal courts is
not extensive enough to cover any more than a small part of wrongful
business practices, the increasing number of convictions, the more ex-
tended character of the restraining decrees and the great expense of
fighting a government prosecution have forced many business estab-
lishments to change their methods in certain respects so as to meet the
demands of the government. 7
DIFFICULTIES AND PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN THE LEGAL DEFINITION OF
UNFAIR COMPETITION
The definition of unfair competition and the prohibition of the mani-
fold unfair practices connected therewith have raised some intricate
legal problems. One of the chief difficulties has been aptly character-
ized by Professor Freund in discussing the attempt to make restraint
of trade an offense with a criminal penalty. If left by the statute with-
out any qualification it is an economic absurdity and if qualified by
requiring injury to the public it is too indefinite, for purposes of
criminal enforcement. 8 The same objection can be raised to many
of the prohibitions against unfair trade which also frequently include
criminal penalties for their violation. Despite these difficulties the
legislatures continue to formulate enactments to prohibit unfair prac-
tices and the courts are being called upon in an increasing number of
cases to render the vague terms of statutes specific and effective.
""It is not sufficient," said the court, "to charge the accused generally with
having committed the offense, but all the circumstances constituting the offense
must be specially set forth." In re Greene (1892, S. D. Oh. W. D.) 52 Fed. 1o4.
See also It re Corning (1892, N. D. Oh. E. D.) 51 Fed. 205; United States v.
Patterson (1893, D. Mass.) 55 Fed. 6o5.
United States v. Patterson (1912, S. D. Oh. W. D.) 2O Fed. 697, (1915, C.
C. A. 6th) 222 Fed. 599.
'Nash v. United States, supra.
'Montague, Business Competition and the Law (9,5) 4.
'Freund, Standards of American Legislation (917) 76.
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CRITICISI OF VAGUENESS OF LEGAL MEANING OF UNFAIR COMPETITION
In the words of a foreign authority
"there does not exist a law on unfair competition: the legislator, in
fact, can not codify a matter whose elements present an extreme
diversity without a sufficient bond to unite them."59
The same sentiment is expressed by one of the English justices who
observed, "to draw a line between fair and unfair competition; be-
tween what is reasonable and unreasonable, passes the power of the
court."60
Probably no exact definition of the term can be given. What is
unfair depends too much upon the special circumstances and conditions
of each case. We do not find anywhere, says a Swiss authority, an
official definition of these words, "the laws, the codes and the regula-
tions are silent in this regard. Authors have proposed definitions, but
none has received general approval.""'
According to Justice Hough, unfair competition consists of selling
goods by means that shock judicial sensibilities. 62  Quotations might
be multiplied showing general agreement as to the uncertainty of the
meaning of the term.
Despite these difficulties however the courts try to distinguish be-
tween what is fair and what is unfair in numerous judicial pronounce-
ments. In affirming that legal protection is afforded not only to trade-
marks and trade names, but also to other evidences of goodwill the
court in Winestock, Lubin & Co. v. Marks observes that the law applies
"to all cases where fraud is practiced by one in securing the trade of a
rival dealer; and these are as many and as various as the ingenuity of
the dishonest schemer can invent.16 3  Unfair competition is held to be
dependent upon principles of law 4 and upon principles of common
business honesty. 5
In the effort to define and to prohibit unfair practices the ineffective
enforcement of the laws enacted is a matter of common observation.
While this difficulty no doubt grows in part from the vagueness of the
term, it also involves considerations respecting the special evils and
complexities which seem to be inseparably connected with modem
"Allart, Traitg thiorique et pratique de la concurrence dfloyale (1892) ch. v.
Mogul Steamship'Co. v. McGregor, Gow & Co. (18gi) A. C. 25, 49.
Chenevard, op. cit., 15.
'Steiff v. Bing (1914, S. D. N. Y.) 215 Fed. 2o4.
Supra.
West Publishing Co. v. Edward Thompson Co. (19o9, E. D. N. Y.) i69 Fed.
833.
Eastern Outfitting Co. v. Manheim (igio) 59 Wash. 428, i1o Pac. 23; Sartor
v. Schaden (1904) 125 Iowa, 696, 1O1 N. W. 511; Dyment v. Lewis (igog) 144
Iowa, 509, 123 N. W. 244.
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business methods. To quote the opinion of one of the leading authori-
ties-on this branch of law:
"It seems sometimes as if the progress of the unscrupulous merchant
and manufacturer in inventing new schemes for filching away the trade
of others unfairly has been far more rapid than that of the courts in
finding ways of protecting the honest business man against such
schemes." 66
In comparison with the number of statutes passed and the multitude
of cases before the courts comparatively few business practices have
been ultimately condemned and prevented through legal procedure.
Furthermore, the application of criminal penalties under these statutes
has been so infrequent as to render the criminal clauses largely use-
less. It is quite apparent that equity can restrain unfair practices by
means of the injunction and damages may be assessed and collected
for injury to goodwill or to business values. But courts will seldom
impose the drastic remedies of fines and imprisonment and very rarely
indeed are such judgments actually enforced.
Part of this ineffectiveness comes no doubt from the nature of unfair
competition. Another part comes from the extreme sensitiveness of
the courts in dealing with wrongs against business ethics. If, as has
been claimed, unfair competition involves methods which shock judicial
sensibilities, then it seems that justices must frequently have been shock
proof so far as affronts to business ethics are concerned. Unquestion-
ably a large part of the ineffectiveness of enforcement results from
the efforts of courts and legislatures to deal with that which can be
regulated only by business interests themselves. We are just begin-
ning to realize that:
"No unfair or dishonest practice will long survive the condemnation
of the men engaged in that trade. The men engaged in business make
the rules of the game, legislatures and courts to the contrary notwith-
standing. The most that legislative bodies do or can do is to write
into statute law more or less imperfectly what the great body of busi-
ness men regard as the approved rules of practice among intelligent
and high-minded business men. '6 7
Perhaps in this observation we have a reason for much of the con-
fusion, loss and inefficiency in the effort of judicial bodies to pass upon
the right or wrong of infractions of business morals.
European nations have recognized this difficulty in the preparation of
a special code for commerce and business, this code being developed in
large part from the practices and customs of traders themselves. Fur-
thermore, they have frequently placed the enforcement of trade restric-
tions in the hands of special tribunals composed of representatives
"Nims, op. cit., ch. v.
"r Williams, The Federal Trade Commission Law (1916) 63 THE ANNTALS, 3.
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selected from those engaged in business and commerce who are thus
charged with the development of a code of business ethics. Such rules
prepared and enforced by active participants in business pursuits are
not so likely to become verbose prohibitions of wrongs which no one
seems able to define but to develop into practical restrictions which
honest and reputable business men find necessary to enforce against the
unscrupulous and the vicious who pray upon the orderly progress of
industrial society.
Not many years ago relief was refused unless infringement of a
technical trade-mark was shown. 8 But occasionally a judge applying
principles of common honesty and sportsmanship began to decide cases
in favor of the complainant which did not involve a trade-mark. More
recently unfair competition has been regarded by some judges "as a
convenient description of offences against commercial morals not in-
cluded in trade-mark infringement." 69
"The tendency of the courts at the present time seems to be to
restrict the scope of the law applicable to technical trade-marks, and
to extend its scope in cases of unfair competition.1 70
Formerly unfair competition was assumed to involve actual or con-
structive fraud. But here again there is a tendency to enjoin acts of
-unsportsmanlike dealing not involving the element of deception.7 1
Although the term is slowly acquiring a new meaning it is still largely
-used in the United States to correspond with the wrong of passing
off.
7 2
Unfair methods of competition then from a legal standpoint are
found primarily "to consist mainly in some form of untrue, deceptive
or misleading publicity."73  Any statement which is designed or calcu-
lated to deceive or defraud, speaking in a legal sense, the lawful
business of another, is held to be evidence of unfair trade.7 4 Certain
forms of competition are with few exceptions now regarded as clearly
illegal, such for example, as inducing another trader to break his
contract, bogus competing concerns, bribery to secure trade secrets,
railroad rebates, intimidation and coercion.7 5  Other unfair practices
are more subtle and the legality or illegality of these is somewhat un-
certain. Among such practices are refusal to sell to retailers who
'Stokes v. Landgraff (1853, N. Y.) 17 Barb. 608; Candee, Swan & Co. v.
Deere & Co. (1870) 54 Ill. 439.
'Rogers, op. cit., 139.
7' Church & Dwight Co. v. Russ (igoo, D. Ind.) 99 Fed. 276, 278.
2XFonotipia Limited v. Bradley (19o9, E. D. N. Y.) 171 Fed. 951; Prest-O-Lite
Co. v. Davis (1913, S. D. Oh. W. D.) 209 Fed. 917; Fair & Carnival Supply Co.
v. Shapiro (igig, E. D. Penn.) 257 Fed. 558.
' Cf. 38 Cyc. 756; White Studio v. Dreyfoos (1917) 221 N. Y. 46, 116 N. E. 796.
Williams, op. cit., 6.
7 Ibid., 8.
75Kales, Good and Bad Trusts (1917) 30 HAgv. L. REv. 830.
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persist in buying of a rival manufacturer, offering a lower price in
certain localities where competition has appeared, and fixing prices at
which the product may be resold."8
However, through the extension of trade-mark cases, special statutes
dealing with unfair competition, and the broadening of the meaning
of these terms by the courts, the law of unfair competition is slowly
being extended "to include the suppression of all deceptive artifices
by which one trader's customers are taken away from him and trans-
ferred to another." The law of unfair competition is beginning to be
conceived as the body of rules designed to regulate the conduct of
those striving for goodwill and trade advantages for themselves."
And with slow and halting steps the courts have been approaching
the formulation of a principle now definitely recognized by the Supreme
Court of the United States,78 namely "that no one shall be permitted to
appropriate to himself the fruits of another's labor. 7  This view if
carried out and extended, as seems likely, will, it is readily understood,
basically alter the former conception of unfair competition. The term
was first used in connection with the infringement of trade-marks and
then as trade-marks were protected by special legislative acts it was
applied to the wrongful passing off of goods for those of another.
Now federal and state courts are developing a meaning for unfair
competition of even greater significance to the business world. There
is a tendency to accept the dictum of Lord Esher that an act of com-
mercial rivalry done not for the purpose of competition but with intent
to injure a rival, is not "an act done in ordinary course of trade, and
therefore is actionable, if injury ensues."' 0 American courts are
arriving at the conception that in the competitive process the individual
has rights which, whether regarded as property or not, are entitled to
protection and that business practices unfair to both the injured party
and the public must be declared inequitable and prevented by judicial
process.8 ' In the language of Justice Pitney when parties are com-
petitors and the rights of one are liable to conflict with those of the
other "each party is under a duty so to conduct its own business as
not necessarily or unfairly injure that of another." It is declared
to be the duty of the court to prevent interferences with the normal
operation of legitimate business which result in diverting profits from
those who have earned them to those who have not.
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6Crowell, Trusts and Competition (1915) 30; Wyman, Unfair Competition
by Monopolistic Corporations (1912) 42 THE ANNALS, 68; Stevens, Resale Price
Maintenance as Unfair Competition (igig) 19 COL. L. REv. 265.
Nims, op. cit., 31.
' International News Service v. The Associated Press (1918) 248 U. S. 215, 39
Sup. Ct.
Ibid., 2.
See Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor, Gow & Co. supra.
"'Cf. Nims, op. cit., ch. ii.
ISee (1919) 32 HARV. L. REv. 566; (1919) 4 CORN. L. QUART. 255.
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PREVENTING UNFAIR COMPETITION TIfROUGH AN ADMINISTRATIVE COM-
MISSION
The most recent method of attacking the evils of unfair competition
is to establish an administrative board whose duty it is to pass upon
unfair practices and to correct so far as possible the evils resulting
therefrom. The former method of procedure was to declare illegal
unfair methods and to provide a private right of action against the
offender. The nature of the remedy was an injunction to prevent the
wrongful act or damages to cover losses resulting from such action.
The common-law decisions with regard to unfair competition have
been confined very largely to passing off and misrepresentation with
the result that the scope of the common law was a decidedly
restricted one in the effort to prevent unfair methods. While the Sher-
man Anti-Trust Act and state legislation relating to trusts gave a more
extensive application of the general principles for the courts and
rendered it possible to prevent certain unfair practices which would not
have been held void under the common law, nevertheless the ineffective-
ness of the private right of action has become notorious. Owing to
the conservatism and the slowness of action in the determination of
such questions before the courts, many cases have dragged on for a
period of ten years or more and often cases were either dropped or
inadequate relief was accorded. Moreover, those who suffer from
unfair practices are often the small but efficient business establishments
which find it impossible to carry their cases to the courts.
The enforcement of the provisions of such laws may be rendered
somewhat more effective by giving special authority to the Attorney-
General to prosecute on behalf of the state on complaint of private
parties or corporations. But despite these attempts to secure a better
enforcement of trust legislation cases on unfair competition often in-
volve economic and statistical facts as well as legal principles, and
to secure an effective enforcement of restrictive business laws, it has
been found necessary to provide additional agencies. For the purpose
of enforcing federal legislation the Federal Trade Commission was
established whose duties were briefly summarized previously. The
work of the Federal Trade Commission has demonstrated the peculiar
advantages in having unfair methods passed upon by an administrative
body rather than leaving the condemnation of such methods solely to
the courts whether under common-law rules or the Sherman Anti-Trust
Act. It is not within the scope of this article to undertake an analysis
of the results accomplished by the Federal Trade Commission nor to
deal with the meaning of unfair methods of competition as defined by
the Commission. However the nature of the work of the Federal
Trade Commission may be indicated by a brief summary of the com-
plaints issued through the Commission for the year ending June 30,
i918. Among the unfair methods condemned by the Commission are:
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exclusive contracts, maintenance of resale prices, commercial bribery,
passing off, misrepresentation, false advertising, accumulative rebates,
tying contracts, intimidation of competitors and inducing cancellation
of orders from competitors.8 3
The particular advantage of the Trade Commission in passing upon
business practices with respect to fairness or unfairness is due to the
consideration that in a large measure the facts involved are economic
as well as legal. The staff of the Federal Trade Commission includes
experts in economics and statistics as well as attorneys. In the final
:preparation of a case the complaint with the evidence and reports of
investigators is turned over to a board of review made up of both
economic experts and attorneys. As a result of the consideration of
the economic as well as the legal aspect of unfair competition combined
-with broad powers of investigation, it is thought that "more adequate
criterions for the determination of what constitutes unfair competition
than could possibly be developed through any other agency than an
administrative board,"84 will be secured. The advantages of the com-
mission are that the procedure is easy, expeditious, and inexpensive,
that the services of the commission are available to the small as well as
to large concerns, and that greater freedom and flexibilitymay besecured
through administrative machinery. The rules of practice announced
by the Commission in its annual reports give an expeditious method of
pressing complaints, making answer thereto, of the issuance of orders,
of the calling of witnesses and of the preparation of briefs with the
presentation of evidence. The tendency of the Commission is to make
the procedure direct and to open the way for the consideration of any
meritorious complaint.
Owing to the care exercised by the Commission in the issuance of its
orders very few of the orders have been contested. Thus far only
a few cases have been appealed to the Circuit Court of Appeals against
the orders of the Commission. Moreover, the courts availing them-
selves of section seven of the Federal Trade Commission law have
called upon the Commission to act as a master in chancery to present a
plan for dissolution of an illegal combination, the plan to be presented
to the District court for confirmation.8 5 In a majority of cases in which
the Commission has brought a complaint against a company for the use
of unfair methods the parties involved have not undertaken to defend
the condemned practices and the Commission's order has not only been
respected but has also formed a rule to guide business men in similar
establishments. While it is too early to attempt an estimate of the
probable results to be accomplished through the establishment of the
Federal Trade Commission, it is believed "that the construction of un-
"I For this summary I am indebted to W. H. Stevens who gives a very valuable
discussion of the work of the Commission in (1919) 82 THE ANNALS, 232.
" Stevens, op. cit., 242.
' United States v. Corn Products Co. (1916, S. D. N. Y.) 234 Fed. 964.
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fair methods of competition by the Commission will tend to gradually
establish itself in the law of the country" and that the Commission will
prove itself a useful and necessary adjunct to the courts and other
agencies engaged in the effort to prevent illegal and unfair business
tactics.88
SOME COMPARISONS WITH RESPECT TO THE METHODS OF REGULATING
UNFAIR COMPETITION IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES
Certain methods of dealing with unfair competition in foreign coun-
tries are of such significance that it seems desirable to give a few note-
worthy comparisons. Under the designation of such terms as "con-
currence dloyale" or "Unlauterer Wettbewerb" 7 the regulation of
unfair business practices has had an interesting development in con-
tinental European countries.88
In Europe these terms apply chiefly to the passing off of goods or
to an intent to cause confusion. The law was originally developed
from broad general provisions of the civil code which by progressive
adaptation of the courts was made applicable to the changing types of
unfair business practices. Later, specific forms of unfair competition
were declared illegal by statute; and, in a few instances, an effort has
been made to combine the chief provisions against unfair business into
a single statute.
The most interesting development is found in France where con-
currence d~loyale, a term not defined in code or statute, is nevertheless
in common use by the courts.89  This branch of law has been developed
from two sections of the civil code, neither of which relates directly
to business. The articles on which the court decisions are based are
1382 and 1839 which are: any act whatever by a person which causes
injury to another obliges him by the fault of whom it happened to com-
pensate it; and, each one is responsible for the injury which he has
caused not only by his act, but also by his negligence or by his
imprudence.
Under these general phrases, courts have condemned numerous
unfair practices relating chiefly to acts intended to produce confusion,
defamatory statements, disloyalty of employees, and acts resulting from
the violation of contracts and agreements. According to the French
courts, an intent to injure is a necessary element of concurrence d~loy-
ale, but acts not involving a wrongful intent are often held unlawful
"Consult, Stevens, op. cit., 265ff.
87 Cf. Pinner, Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb (5th ed. i91o).
' Cf. Francis Walker, Policies of Germany, England, Canada and The United
States Towards Combinations (igi2) 42 THE ANNALS, 183.
Chenevard, op. cit., Allart, op. cit.; Pouillet, Traitg des marques de
fabrique et de la concurrence d6loyale en tous genres (1912).
YALE LAW JOURNAL
under the designation "concurrence illicite."90 The latter act is re-
garded as a tort, and involves merely a right of action for damages to
the injured party. Special tribunals of commerce are constituted to
try cases of unfair practices.9 ' Supplementary to the above provisions
of the civil code are a number of special statutes declaring certain
practices illegal. These laws condemn chiefly the misuse of names,
titles, and trade-marks. A recent statute makes illegal the practice of
fraud in the sale of merchandise particularly when such fraud results
in injury to the public health.
In Germany, unfair practices were dealt with by separate statutes
dealing with patents and trade-marks and finally by special enactments
in 1896 and 19o9 defining in detail and declaring illegal unfair business
methods.92  The recent law of 19o9 adds a general clause similar to the
sections of the French code whereby acts are declared unfair which
are against good morals. Among the practices condemned are de-
ceptive advertising, bribery of employees, misrepresentations, misuse of
trade names and disclosure of secrets. Special boards of arbitration
are formed to decide cases of unfair practices.
The federal government and cantons of Switzerland have passed
numerous acts relating to unfair trade. In the main they follow the
plan of the French and German systems.
Among the recent foreign enactments are the Greek Law of De-
cember 26, 1913, Denmark's Law of 1912, the Australian Industries
Preservation Act of 19o6-1o, all of which aim to prohibit certain
specific forms of unfair business.
Three steps are readily discernible in the growth of the law of
unfair competition: first, statutes and judicial decisions relate to trade-
marks and trade names; second, special laws are enacted covering
false advertisements, bogus sales, corruption of employees and betrayal
of business secrets; third, unfair competition is extended to include
combinations and agreements that interfere with competition such as
exclusive dealing and tying contracts. The latter type of law has been
enacted especially in the British Self-Governing Colonies, and in the
United States.
The present tendency in foreign legislation appears to be to have a
general provision of law under which varying forms of unfair com-
petitive practices may be suppressed and then by special laws to con-
demn certain obnoxious practices. The basic idea of unfair com-
petition in most foreign countries is an act which injures unjustly a
competitor and little consideration is given as a rule to the effect of an
' "II y a concurrence d~loyale lorsque l'acte a t accompli de mauvaise foi; il
y a concurrence illicite lorsquil a iti accompli sans inauvaise foi." Chenevard, op.
cit., 17.
"
1For a summary of French laws on unfair trading and a brief account of
unfair competition in other foreign countries, see Davies, op. cit., 559ff.
' Chenevard, op. cit., 28ff.
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act upon the general public.9 3 The courts of the United States are
foremost in the tendency to hold that the effect of acts upon the gen-
eral public must be taken into accountf 4
Unfair competition has been the subject of several important in-
ternational agreements including a convention for the protection of
industrial property signed in Washington in 1911 and acceded to by
the majority of the great nations and an international agreement for
the regulation of trade-marks also signed at Washington in 1911. 95
Chambers of commerce and various commercial bodies have dis-
cussed the advisability of international action against unfair competi-
tion. Special efforts have been made to secure the general adoption of a
system similar to that of France and to secure the recognition of unfair
competition as a matter for common regulation in all countries. The
plan of an international trade commission whose duty it is to prescribe
regulations whereby the competition between nations may be made fair
is strongly recommended by those interested in securing a higher stand-
ard of commercial ethics.90
In so far as unfair competition is based upon principles of law the
determination and application of which are relatively clear, the enforce-
ment of rules against unfair practices may be dealt with by the courts
with a fair degree of effectiveness. But some of the so-called legal
principles with respect to unfair competition are too vague and uncer-
tain and too many differences of opinion arise to render satisfactory the
results of the legal effort to define unfair competition. Moreover, in so
far as the courts claim it their duty to protect an honest trader and
restrain a dishonest one from carrying out his schemes or to repress
any act which is unjust, inequitable or dishonest, the determination of
the dividing line between fair and unfair grows out of economic con-
ditions and business relations on which it is very difficult if not impos-
sible for the courts to pass intelligent judgments. It is in this field
that administrative commissions with the assistance of economists and
lawyers and with a more elastic procedure can more effectively reach
and prevent wrongs for which the slow and cumbersome process of
the law affords inadequate remedies. But the attempt to define unfair
competition in the United States both by decrees of courts and adminis-
trative action through a trade commission shows the prime necessity
of the co-operation of business organizations and commercial bodies
through special commerce courts or commissions whose duty it is to
formulate more specifically a code of business ethics and then to join
with the courts and with other government agencies in securing their
enforcement. It seems desirable in this regard to give careful con-
"Davies, op. cit.
" Wilder Mfg. Co. v. Cori Products Co., supra.
'Davies, op. cit., 700ff; Chenevard, op. cit., 39ff.
" See address by William Smith Culbertson on The Open Door and Colonial
Policy before the American Economic Association, at Richmond, Virginia, 1x18.
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sideration to the practice of certain European countries which have
developed a commercial code the enforcement of which is left in large
part to specially constituted courts. Whatever method is pursued it
seems likely that laws and judicial decisions on unfair competition
will multiply, that the functions of administrative trade commissions
will increase and that a larger share in the formulation of principles of
business law and in their enforcement will be assumed by the organized
business interests. The law dealing with unfair business competition
remains in large part yet to be developed but sufficient progress has
been made to indicate the main principles and characteristics of this
development.
